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I. INTRODUCTION 
One of Congress’s primary motives in passing the Personal 
Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (also known as 
the Personal Responsibility Act, hereinafter, the “Act”) was to “remove 
the incentive for illegal immigration provided by the availability of 
public benefits.”1 It attempted to achieve this objective in part by 
permitting states to decide whether certain aliens would or would not 
receive various public benefits, including Medicaid.2 This legislation 
marked the first occasion in which the federal government had delegated 
to the states its previously exclusive authority over immigration matters, 
and since its enactment it has sparked considerable debate regarding its 
constitutionality. 
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 1 Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. 
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A number of states have taken advantage of Congress’s offer to 
deny benefits to aliens; not surprisingly, two state high courts have also 
weighed in on the Act’s constitutional implications.3 The federal 
judiciary, however, had remained silent on the topic until the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit decided to uphold the Act 
against a challenge to a Colorado law in Soskin v. Reinertson.4 This 
Comment analyzes the court’s reasoning and how well it stands up to 
various criticisms. Part II discusses the history of the federal immigration 
power and how it has evolved to its present state. It examines the various 
sources of this power, both textual and extraconstitutional, as well as 
how the power has been defined by the Supreme Court of the United 
States. Part III analyzes Soskin in light of existing immigration 
jurisprudence. It compares the Tenth Circuit’s reasoning with the 
Supreme Court’s holdings in Graham v. Richardson5 and Mathews v. 
Diaz.6 Part III also argues that Soskin is highly questionable under the 
Graham/Mathews rubric, and that Supreme Court precedent does not 
support the Soskin majority’s reasoning. Part IV examines the various 
arguments, aside from those explicitly elucidated in Soskin, put forth in 
favor of and against Congress’s ability to devolve its immigration 
authority to the states. It explores both jurisprudentially-based and 
policy-based arguments against the backdrop of Soskin. Finally, Part IV 
addresses the important questions of how this will affect both the states 
and the aliens residing within them, and whether this legislation has had 
(or can possibly have) the deterrent effect that Congress envisioned. 
II. THE FEDERAL IMMIGRATION POWER 
The United States government’s exclusive authority to make laws 
relating to aliens and immigration has been well established for over a 
century. In developing what has come to be known as the plenary power 
doctrine, the Supreme Court has drawn both directly from the 
Constitution and from the doctrinal concept of the inherent authority 
residing in all sovereign nations. While the text of the Constitution does 
not explicitly bestow the government with complete authority in the 
realm of immigration, there are several specific grants. These include the 
Foreign Commerce Clause,7 which the Supreme Court has held includes 
                                                                                                             
 3 See Doe v. Comm’r of Transitional Assistance, 773 N.E.2d 404 (Mass. 2002); 
Aliessa v. Novello, 754 N.E.2d 1085 (N.Y. 2001). 
 4 353 F.3d 1242 (10th Cir. 2004). 
 5 403 U.S. 365 (1971). 
 6 426 U.S. 67 (1976). 
 7 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
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the “bringing of persons into the ports of the United States,”8 the 
Naturalization Clause, which vests Congress with the power “to establish 
an uniform rule of naturalization,”9 and the treaty power, which permits 
the President, “with the advice and consent of the Senate,”10 to make 
treaties with foreign nations. Certain international treaties have included 
provisions that affect non-citizens within the jurisdiction of the United 
States, and as such this clause has been considered contributory to the 
federal immigration power.11   
Despite these clauses, which grant federal authority in certain 
contexts pertaining to immigration, it is clear that the Constitution does 
not explicitly grant to the federal government plenary authority to control 
all immigration matters. For this reason the Supreme Court has not relied 
solely, or even primarily, on the Constitution to support its formulation 
of the plenary power doctrine. The Court instead turned to the principle 
of inherent sovereignty to justify this now-embedded facet of American 
jurisprudence. A considerable line of Supreme Court decisions in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries12 relied upon the ancient global 
concept that each nation has the exclusive and immutable ability to make 
and enforce laws regarding aliens, because this ability is “inherent in 
sovereignty, necessary for maintaining normal international relations and 
defending the country against foreign encroachments and dangers.”13 The 
Supreme Court has consistently held that immigration-related laws, no 
matter how unfair, oppressive, or inimical to American values they may 
seem, are solely within the province of the executive and legislative 
branches of the federal government and are thus “largely immune from 
judicial inquiry.”14  This immensely broad power has, throughout the 
past century, periodically resulted in the passage of laws that blatantly 
smack of nativism and prejudice. Consequently, the plenary power 
doctrine has at times been harshly criticized on a number of grounds.15 
                                                                                                             
 8 Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 712 (1893). 
 9 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4. 
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 11 See, e.g., Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 
U.N.T.S. 331. 
 12 See Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. 698; Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651 
(1892); Chae Chan Ping v. United States 130 U.S. 581 (1889). 
 13 Kleindanst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 765 (1972). 
 14 Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 589 (1952). 
 15 See Gabriel J. Chin, Segregation’s Last Stronghold: Race Discrimination and the 
Constitutional Law of Immigration, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1 (1998) (arguing, inter alia,  that 
racial elitism, not economic protectionism, was, and continues to be, the primary 
motivating factor behind the plenary power doctrine); see also Alexander Aleinikoff, 
Federal Regulation of Aliens and the Constitution, 83 AM. J. INT’L. L. 862 (1989) 
(arguing that laws permitting deportation of aliens for speech or expression otherwise 
protected by the First Amendment are paradoxical); Peter H. Schuck, The Transformation 
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Nonetheless, this doctrine is firmly entrenched both in the United States 
and abroad.16 
But the plenary power doctrine, as sweeping as it may be, does not 
relieve our government from its duty to uphold the Constitution. The 
Supreme Court has held that all aliens—even unlawful ones—enjoy 
certain guarantees of due process.17 Due process, however, has proven to 
be quite an elastic term, and the Court has made clear that satisfaction of 
its demands is almost always contingent upon the individual and his 
circumstances. Thus, in Mathews, the Court stated that “the fact that . . . 
aliens and citizens alike[] are protected by the Due Process Clause does 
not lead to the further conclusion that all aliens are entitled to enjoy all 
the advantages of citizenship . . . .”18 The Mathews court was confronted 
with the question of whether Congress has the authority to pass 
legislation that discriminates against aliens. The challenged federal law 
required aliens to reside continuously in the United States for at least five 
years before they could be eligible for participation in the Medicare Part 
B insurance program.19 The petitioners argued, and the U.S. District 
Court for the Southern District of Florida agreed, that the requirement 
violated aliens’ Fifth Amendment right to due process.20 The government 
then appealed directly to the Supreme Court, which overturned the lower 
court ruling. In doing so the Court emphasized this nation’s long history 
of legislatively differentiating citizens from non-citizens, listing a great 
number of federal laws that assign rights, privileges, and prohibitions to 
citizens that plainly differ from those assigned to aliens.21 The Court 
went on to explain the government’s justifications in making these 
distinctions, relying upon the concept of political sovereignty discussed 
above.22 The Court had no difficulty holding that Congress was 
empowered to discriminate against aliens as a class, and spent only a 
short time discussing this established authority.23 It was, however, 
somewhat more troubled by discrimination within the alien class against 
aliens who had not resided in the country for more than five years, and in 
                                                                                                             
of Immigration Law, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1984) (arguing that the policy of excluding 
immigration-related laws from constitutional scrutiny is antiquated and ripe for reform). 
 16 See EMER DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS (Joseph Chitty ed., T. & J.W. Johnson 
& Co. 1876) (1758) (positing that all nations possess certain powers from the point of 
their inception as sovereign entities). 
 17 See Wong Tang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33 (1950); Russian Volunteer Fleet v. 
United States, 282 U.S. 481 (1931). 
 18 Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 78 (1976). 
 19 See id. at 69. 
 20 See id. at 73. 
 21 See id at 78-80. 
 22 See id. 
 23 See id. 
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favor of those who had.24 This species of discrimination, the Court 
found, was not as neatly justified under the plenary power doctrine 
because aliens were not being uniformly discriminated against.25 Instead, 
the law could be viewed as beneficial to some aliens and detrimental to 
others.26 
On this matter, the Court began by reiterating that Congress has no 
duty to provide all aliens with the benefits available to citizens.27 
Obviously Congress is also not forbidden from providing some portion 
of such benefits to aliens, so the pertinent question before the Court was 
whether “the party challenging the constitutionality of the particular line 
Congress has drawn [can advance] principled reasoning that will at once 
invalidate that line and yet tolerate a different line separating some aliens 
from others.”28 The Court here essentially inquired whether the 
classification Congress made had a rational basis relating to a legitimate 
government objective; the answer to the inquiry, not surprisingly, was 
that it did. The Court stated that “both the character and the duration of 
[an alien’s] residence” are reasonable factors to weigh in considering 
whether he should be eligible to receive public benefits.29 
The permissive standard set forth in Mathews stands in sharp 
contrast to the Court’s treatment of state laws that discriminate against 
aliens. In Graham v. Richardson the Supreme Court held that any such 
state legislation must be struck down as violative of the Equal Protection 
Clause unless it can withstand strict judicial scrutiny.30 The Court’s 
reasoning was based largely on the fact that alienage has been deemed a 
suspect classification,31 which means that any state law discriminating on 
the basis of alienage must advance a compelling state interest by 
employing the least restrictive means possible.32 The states are beholden 
to this heightened level of scrutiny because they, unlike the federal 
government, are not exempted from constitutional constraints by way of 
the plenary power doctrine.33 Graham involved two state statutes, one 
that created a fifteen-year residency requirement for receipt of public 
benefits,34 and another that denied public assistance to aliens altogether.35 
                                                                                                             
 24 See id. at 80-81. 
 25 See id. at 80. 
 26 See id. at 81. 
 27 See id. at 82. 
 28 Id. 
 29 Id. at 83. 
 30 Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971). 
 31 See id. at 371-72; see also Takahashi v. Fish and Game Comm’n, 334 U.S. 410 
(1948). 
 32 See, e.g., Bernal v. Fainter, 467 U.S. 216 (1984). 
 33 See Graham, 403 U.S. at 377. 
 34 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 46-233 (1962). 
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The State appellants in Graham sought to justify the challenged 
statutes on the basis of the states’ “special public-interest” in advocating 
their own citizens’ welfare by allocating state resources so as to benefit 
members of the state at the expense of non-citizens.36 While the Court 
conceded that it had in the past upheld statutes that favored citizens at the 
expense of non-citizens, none of those statutes involved the withholding 
of public benefits from aliens in order to ensure disbursement to 
citizens.37 Moreover, the Court expressed doubt over “the continuing 
validity of the special public-interest doctrine . . . .”38 The fact that a 
suspect classification was imposed by the two appellant states was of 
central significance to the Court, and no doubt solidified its decision to 
reject the special public-interest doctrine in this context.39 The Court 
stated that “[t]he saving of welfare costs cannot justify an otherwise 
invidious classification.”40 While a special public-interest argument may 
have been found sufficient to justify a non-suspect classification, the 
Court concluded that, because the classification was premised upon 
alienage, the states were obligated to show a compelling interest in order 
to validate it.41 The states’ fiscal motives did not meet this demanding 
threshold, and the Court therefore found the laws in violation of the 
Equal Protection Clause.42 
While the Court might have stopped there, it instead offered 
another reason why the states could not discriminate against aliens. 
Immigration, the Graham Court announced, is “an area constitutionally 
entrusted to the Federal Government.”43  If Congress, “in the exercise of 
the superior authority in this field, has enacted a complete scheme of 
regulation . . . states cannot . . . conflict or interfere with, curtail or 
complement, the federal law . . . .”44 The Court concluded that 
Congress’s federal policy entailed a “complete scheme,” and that state 
legislation in this realm was therefore entirely foreclosed.45 Five years 
later, the Mathews Court reflected upon and expanded this language in 
order to permit federal discrimination against this suspect class.46 
                                                                                                             
 35 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 62, § 432.2 (1967). 
 36 Graham, 403 U.S. at 372. 
 37 See id. at 373. 
 38 Id. at 374. 
 39 See id. at 575-76. 
 40 Id. at 375 (quoting Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 633 (1969)). 
 41 See id. at 376. 
 42 See id. 
 43 Id. at 378. 
 44 Id. 
 45 Id. 
 46 See Mathews, 426 U.S. 67. 
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The Graham Court also addressed one final issue. The state of 
Arizona had argued that a federal law authorized the implementation of 
its discriminatory statute, and that the state was therefore acting in 
concert with uniform federal immigration law.47 The Court managed to 
evade the difficult question of whether Congress’s immigration power 
was delegable, concluding that the statute did not grant the authorization 
that Arizona claimed.48 However, in its treatment of this claim the Court 
tipped its hand as to its position on the matter. The statute was admittedly 
ambiguous and was unaccompanied by significant legislative history, 
and may have been interpreted in Arizona’s favor.49 However, the Court 
found that if the statute “were to be read so as to authorize discriminatory 
treatment of aliens at the option of the States . . . serious constitutional 
questions are presented.”50 The Court did not explicitly state that 
Congress was forbidden from delegating its power; such a statement 
would have been dictum in any event. Still, the Court’s comment that 
“‘statutes should be construed whenever possible so as to uphold their 
constitutionality’” at least suggests that it did not believe the immigration 
power may be passed down to the states.51 
Graham and Mathews are unequivocal in their respective holdings: 
Congress can pass legislation discriminating against aliens with virtual 
impunity, and the states are forbidden from doing so in the absence of a 
compelling interest. The Personal Responsibility Act, however, has 
created a situation aptly described by the Soskin court as falling 
“somewhere in between.”52 
III. SOSKIN’S TREATMENT OF THE PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY ACT 
Congress enacted the Personal Responsibility Act in 1996. Its 
passage came partially in response to a growing reliance among 
                                                                                                             
 47 According to the state’s argument, section 1402(b) of the Social Security Act 
authorized a durational residency requirement for aliens. Graham, 403 U.S. at 380. That 
section provides: “The Secretary [of Health, Education and Welfare] . . . shall not 
approve any plan which imposes, as a condition of eligibility for aid to the permanently 
and totally disabled under the plan . . . [a]ny citizenship requirement which excludes any 
citizen of the United States.” 42 U.S.C. § 1352(b). The state argued that the provision 
forbidding citizenship requirements from preventing citizens from receiving benefits 
could be read to authorize a provision that would prevent non-citizens from receiving 
benefits. Graham, 403 U.S. at 380. The Court rightly pointed out that “[o]n its face, the 
statute does not affirmatively authorize, much less command, the States to adopt 
durational residency requirements . . . .” Graham, 403 U.S. at 381. 
 48 Graham, 403 U.S. at 380-81. 
 49 See id. at 381. 
 50 Id. at 382. 
 51 Id. at 382-83 (quoting United States v. Vultch, 402 U.S. 62, 70 (1971)). 
 52 Soskin v. Reinertson, 353 F.3d 1242, 1254 (10th Cir. 2004). 
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immigrants on public benefits in general, and on Medicare and Medicaid 
in particular Congress predicted the Act would result in about $53 billion 
in savings, and almost $24 billion, or 44%, of that amount was to be 
derived from the denial of benefits to legal aliens.53 The Act set forth 
specific eligibility criteria that significantly reduced the number of aliens 
qualified to receive benefits within the U.S.54 The largest change brought 
about by this Act was the new mandate that any alien must reside within 
the U.S. for at least five years before becoming eligible for benefits.55 
Numerous additional criteria for receipt of benefits were also included in 
the Act.56 Several designated groups of aliens, however, were guaranteed 
benefits by the Act irrespective of the duration of their residency.57 
In addition to setting definitive criteria for the grant or denial of 
public funds, the Act also permitted the states either to grant or deny 
certain public benefits to qualified aliens.58 In other words, the federal 
government prohibited the states from providing benefits to any aliens 
(other than the narrow exempted classes) who have not resided in the 
country for five years, but it allowed the states to decide whether they 
would grant certain benefits once the five-year requirement has been 
                                                                                                             
 53 Cong. Budget Office, Federal Budgetary Implications of the Personal 
Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, at 3 tbl.S-2 (1996) 
available at http://cbo.gov/ftpdocs/46xx/doc4664/1996Doc32.pdf. 
 54 See Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, 
Pub. L. No. 104-93, §§ 401-403, 411-12, 110 Stat. 2113-24, 2148-53 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 8 and 42 U.S.C.). 
 55 8 U.S.C.A. § 1613 (West 2005). 
 56 Id. Only “qualified aliens” are eligible for public benefits after a five-year 
residency period. “Qualified aliens” are defined as those aliens: 
(1) [W]ho [are] lawfully admitted for permanent residence under the 
Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C.A. § 1101 et seq.); (2) [W]ho 
[have been] granted asylum under section 208 of such Act (8 U.S.C.A. § 
1158); (3) [Who are] refugees . . . admitted to the United States under 
section 207 of such Act (8 U.S.C.A. § 1157); (4) [Who are] paroled into the 
United States under section 212(d)(5) of such Act (8 U.S.C.A. § 1182(d)(5)) 
for a period of at least 1 year; (5) [W]hose deportation[s]  [are] being 
withheld under section 243(h) of such Act (8 U.S.C.A. § 1253(h)); (6) [Who 
[are] granted conditional entry pursuant to section 203(a)(7) of such Act as 
in effect prior to April 1, 1980 (8 U.S.C.A. § 1153(a)(7)); or (7)  [W]ho 
[are] Cuban and Haitian entrant[s] (as defined in section 501(e) of the 
Refugee Education Assistance Act of 1980). 
8 U.S.C.A. § 1641(b) (West 2005). 
The Act permits aliens who have been subjected to domestic abuse while in the 
United States to become qualified for certain public benefits. 8 U.S.C.A. §1641(c)(2005). 
 57 See 8 U.S.C.A. § 1613(b) (West 2005) (Aliens exempted from the five-year 
requirement include active duty military or veterans, their spouses and dependent 
children, and aliens designated as refugees, among others.). 
 58 See 8 U.S.C.A. § 1612(b) (West 2005) (The state may grant to or withhold from 
qualified aliens the following benefits: temporary assistance for needy families 
(“TANF”), Social Services block grants, and Medicaid.). 
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satisfied.59 Colorado was one of the states to invoke this provision of the 
Act. After the federal statute’s enactment in 1997, that state chose to 
continue providing uniform coverage to all of its residents despite 
Congress’s decree that only certain aliens were entitled to receive 
benefits. This policy changed, however, in 2003, when the Colorado 
legislature decided that an “enormous budget shortfall” required drastic 
action.60 In accordance with the Act, the legislature withdrew Medicaid 
benefits from all aliens not statutorily entitled by the Personal 
Responsibility Act to receive them.61 A class of aliens challenged the 
state law, alleging it violated the Equal Protection Clause.62 
The case quickly reached the Tenth Circuit.63 Although the 
plaintiffs claimed that the Colorado law fell squarely within the 
prohibited class of laws under Graham, the Soskin court stated that “the 
issue is more nuanced” than it initially appeared.64 Despite the Graham 
Court’s seemingly strong indication that devolvability is beyond 
Congress’s power, the Soskin court did not read the decision as such. The 
court stated that “if the [Supreme] Court had definitively decided that the 
distinctions made in Arizona law would be unconstitutional regardless of 
Congressional authorization, there would have been no cause for the 
Court to examine the legislative history that Arizona relied upon.”65 The 
Soskin court did not read Graham to suggest that devolvability was 
impermissible, but rather read it to require unequivocal legislative intent 
to permit state-based discrimination before it would address the issue. 
The court next addressed the statement made in Graham that 
“Congress does not have the power to authorize the individual states to 
violate the Equal Protection Clause.”66 While this statement might be 
taken plainly to proscribe a delegatory law such as the Personal 
Responsibility Act, the Soskin court did not see it that way. Rather, the 
court viewed this statement as “almost tautological,”67 and concluded 
that the pertinent inquiry was whether a devolution of the immigration 
power was in fact a constitutional violation.68 The court seems to have 
reasoned that if the states can be clothed with the same broad authority to 
                                                                                                             
 59 See id. 
 60 Soskin v. Reinertson, 353 F.3d 1242, 1246 (10th Cir. 2004). 
 61 Id. 
 62 Id. at 1246-47. 
 63 The law went into effect in April of 2003, and the Tenth Circuit’s decision was 
published only nine months later, in January of 2004. 
 64 Id. at 1254. 
 65 Id. 
 66 Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 382 (1971). 
 67 Soskin, 353 F.3d at 1254. 
 68 See id. 
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discriminate that Congress possesses, then equal protection becomes no 
more of a problem than it was in Mathews.69 
The Soskin court was also faced with the task of reconciling another 
remark made in Graham that seems to deal a blow to any argument in 
favor of the Act’s constitutionality. The Graham Court stated that “[a] 
congressional enactment construed so as to permit state legislatures to 
adopt divergent laws on the subject of citizenship requirements for 
federally supported welfare programs would appear to contravene [the] 
explicit constitutional requirement of uniformity.”70 The Soskin majority 
emphasized the phrase “would appear to,” and attempted to explain why 
that appearance is false.71 The court pointed out that the constitutional 
uniformity requirement is restricted to the “Rule of Naturalization,” and 
that the relationship between naturalization and eligibility requirements 
for public benefits is attenuated at best.72  The court did not mention, 
however, that uniformity has been considered by the Supreme Court to 
be a cardinal objective in all aspects of immigration law—not just in the 
narrow realm of naturalization. Thus, in Plyler v. Doe, the Court stated 
that states are to adhere to federal classifications that they themselves 
could not impose, “if the Federal Government has by uniform rule 
prescribed what it believes to be appropriate standards for the treatment 
of an alien subclass . . . .”73  The majority also reasoned that the 
appearance of unconstitutionality is false because the plenary power 
doctrine derives primarily from the extraconstitutional notion of inherent 
sovereignty rather than from any one textual provision of the 
Constitution.  Again, this assertion, while valid, ignores the fact that a 
single comprehensive policy toward the treatment of aliens has always 
been considered a fundamental objective in exercising the immigration 
power; whether this power has been deemed to flow directly from 
constitutional text or from a partially independent doctrine of inherent 
sovereignty is not relevant. 
In concluding that the uniformity requirement is not fatal to the Act, 
the majority was also called on to explain why it declined to accept the 
reasoning of the Court of Appeals of New York, upon which the 
plaintiffs chiefly relied. In Aliessa v. Novello, the New York court struck 
down a law functionally equivalent to the Colorado law on the ground 
that it was subject to strict scrutiny, irrespective of the federal 
                                                                                                             
 69 See id. at 1254-55. 
 70 Graham, 403 U.S. at 382. 
 71 Soskin, 353 F.3d at 1256. 
 72 Id. at 1256-57. 
 73 457 U.S. 202, 219 n.19 (1982) (emphasis added). 
2005] Soskin: Withholding Medicaid From Aliens 349 
authorization afforded under the Act.74 The Aliessa court also held that 
the Act itself was unconstitutional, stating that “it is directly in the teeth 
of Graham . . . .”75 The Aliessa court took exception to the fact that the 
Act does not promote uniform immigration policy, but that it instead 
produces “potentially wide variation based on idiosyncratic concepts of 
largesse, economics and politics.”76 
The Soskin court rejected the Aliessa court’s analysis of the Act. 
While it did concede that the justification for a relaxed standard of 
review in the case of federal immigration legislation is that it enables 
Congress to implement “national policy that Congress has the 
constitutional power to enact,”77 the majority did not view the Act as 
diverging from that goal of uniformity. The court went on to state: 
What Plaintiffs fail to consider is that a state’s exercise of 
discretion can also effectuate national policy. Recall that the 
[Act] does not give the states unfettered discretion. Some 
coverage must be provided to aliens; some coverage is forbidden. 
State discretion is limited to the remaining optional range of 
coverage. In exercising that discretion each state is to make its 
own assessment of whether it can bear the burden of providing 
any optional coverage.78 
By this language it seems that the court is attempting to define the 
Act not to be a full and true devolution of Congressional authority at all, 
but merely a manifestation of Congressional intent, albeit one that 
permits some wiggle room within which the states are free to operate. By 
embracing this reading of the statute the court was able to avoid going so 
far as to hold that Congress’s plenary immigration power is inherently 
delegable to the states. Instead it held only that the power is delegable to 
the extent that it has been delegated in this particular statute.79 This 
analysis raises an obvious question: to what extent may the power be 
delegated before the plenary power doctrine is fatally compromised? It 
would be a daunting judicial challenge to determine, in future cases 
involving delegatory immigration-related statutes, whether Congress has 
granted just enough discretion to the states or too much. Moreover, even 
within the bounds set by Congress in this Act, the majority seemed to 
dismiss the obvious potential for what the Aliessa court referred to as 
                                                                                                             
 74 754 N.E.2d 1085 (N.Y. 2001). 
 75 Id. at 1098. 
 76 Id. 
 77 Soskin, 353 F.3d at 1255. 
 78 Id. 
 79 Id. 
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“wide variation” in state immigration policies;80 it simply concluded that 
the finite nature of the states’ discretion works to validate the Act under 
Graham.81 
The dissenting opinion in Soskin is grounded in the Equal 
Protection Clause.82 The dissent maintained that the states may not 
discriminate on the basis of alienage, and that, therefore, the Colorado 
law must be subjected to strict scrutiny analysis.83 Vital to this 
conclusion was the dissent’s staunch position that the immigration power 
must reside exclusively within the federal government.84 Judge Henry 
explicitly rejected the devolvability theory espoused by the majority, 
opining that 
[t]o permit a comprehensive Congressional devolution of its 
exclusive powers would be tantamount to saying “that those 
lawfully admitted to the country under the authority of the acts of 
Congress, instead of enjoying in a substantial sense and in their 
full scope the privileges conferred by the admission, would be 
segregated in such of the states as chose to offer hospitality.”85 
The dissent went on to endorse the Aliessa court’s view that 
uniformity is a necessary component of national immigration law.86 The 
dissenting judge was particularly persuaded by the legislature’s 
admission that the Act embodies “a compromise on a difficult public 
policy question” because it allows the states to provide benefits to aliens 
in accordance with their respective budgetary constraints.87 This 
statement, the dissent declared, proves that the Act does not engender 
any uniform policy, but rather condones “a patchwork of state 
policies.”88 It seems that, unlike the majority opinion, which may be 
accused of having engaged in questionable semantic maneuvers in order 
to construe the Act as constitutional, the dissent chose instead to give the 
Supreme Court’s words their plainest and most obvious meaning. What 
the majority took to be “tautological”—the statement made in Graham 
that Congress may not “authorize the States to violate the Equal 
Protection Clause”—the dissent found dispositive.89 
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IV. ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST THE DEVOLVABILITY PRINCIPLE 
At the heart of the Soskin decision is the notion that the plenary 
power doctrine may be supplemented, without violating the Constitution, 
so as to allow Congress to share its power with the states. Several 
commentators have weighed in on whether there is any room for a 
devolvability principle within federal immigration jurisprudence. These 
arguments take two basic forms: those based on jurisprudence and those 
based on public policy. Each group will be discussed in turn. 
1. Jurisprudentially-Based Arguments 
Constitutional arguments in favor of devolvability are difficult to 
formulate and defend primarily because there is an almost complete 
dearth of textual support for state-based immigration regulation. While it 
is true that the states were almost exclusively in charge of creating 
immigration standards and rules through the end of the nineteenth 
century,90 this was due not to any affirmative grant, but to a “federal 
legislative vacuum.”91 This vacuum was rapidly filled near the turn of the 
twentieth century by a stream of legislation setting a series of standards 
for immigration and naturalization.92 The Supreme Court almost 
invariably approved of these laws, and in the process outlined the 
contours of the plenary power doctrine until it became the virtual carte 
blanche it is today.93 The Supreme Court’s formulation of this doctrine 
has, as a direct result, withdrawn virtually all immigration power from 
the states. 
Nevertheless, some legally grounded arguments can be advanced in 
favor of devolvability. First, and most simply, the federal plenary power, 
if it is truly plenary, may be understood to allow Congress to do 
whatever it pleases with it. William Cohen has suggested that the 
Mathews decision elicits exactly this presumption, claiming that 
“Congress’s [delegatory] power is limited only by the constitutional 
restrictions on the use of alienage classifications in federal legislation.”94 
As Mathews demonstrates, such constitutional restrictions consist only of 
the requirement that a law meet a rational basis standard. Cohen bases 
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this conclusion on the fact that the Supreme Court has thus far been 
unwilling to place any limits on the government’s ability to deny benefits 
to aliens, and that therefore “it follows that congressional power to 
validate the most ‘invidious’ state alienage classifications is also 
limitless.”95 Although Cohen does not go any further in explaining why 
Congress’s exclusive power includes the ability to compromise that 
exclusivity, it is not entirely illogical to assume that “plenary” means just 
that. 
However, the fact that the Supreme Court has not yet placed any 
meaningful reins on Congress’s immigration power does not mean that it 
will not do so. While the doctrine is based on the inherent sovereignty 
principle and, to some extent, the enumerated federal powers granted by 
the Constitution, it is nonetheless largely a judicially conceived body of 
law and is therefore malleable, despite a century-long trend of judicial 
deference. Indeed, commentators have questioned the validity and 
sustainability of the doctrine, and have in some cases gone so far as to 
predict its inevitable demise.96   
Moreover, if plenary power over immigration finds its source in 
natural sovereignty then its only true limit may be where it can and, more 
importantly, cannot reside.97 In other words, only the federal government 
can wield a power borne out of its own sovereignty; the power loses its 
legitimacy when a subordinate entity assumes control of it, whether that 
assumption is expressly countenanced or not. This view has been 
espoused by Barbara Arnold, who stated that “[t]o delegate a sovereign 
power is to tear it from its source,” and that the devolution of a sovereign 
power is akin to “a flower cut from the vine”—just as the flower 
“withers shortly afterward, so does the power of the sovereign cease to 
exist when separated from its source.”98 
Evidently, the Soskin majority held a view closer to Cohen’s than to 
Arnold’s, but it did not satisfactorily explain why it took this position. 
The court acknowledged that the immigration power is derived, at least 
in part, from inherent sovereignty,99 and yet it included no discussion 
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whether this peculiar source of power warranted special consideration as 
to its devolvability. On the contrary, the court merely treated the Act as a 
run-of-the-mill Congressional enactment, stating simply that “[o]nce 
Congress has expressed [national] policy, the courts must be 
deferential.”100 In this way, it seems that the majority overlooked (or 
perhaps deliberately disregarded) an important distinction between this 
“policy” and the vast majority of federally-imposed policy. Although 
presented with a golden opportunity to do so, the majority chose not to 
engage the issue of devolvability—an issue at the very core of the 
question whether the Personal Responsibility Act is constitutional—in 
any meaningful way. Whether an act of willful evasion or merely an 
incomplete analysis, the opinion seems to appreciate neither the 
uniqueness nor the peculiar history of the plenary power doctrine. 
Another jurisprudential argument that may be voiced in favor of 
devolvability stems from the only other area of equal protection 
jurisprudence in which the level of judicial scrutiny differs depending on 
whether the legislation is federal- or state-based: Native American law.101 
In Washington v. Confederated Bands and Tribes of the Yakima Indian 
Nation, the Supreme Court upheld state legislation that almost certainly 
would not have survived a strict scrutiny analysis on the basis that it was 
enacted “under [the] explicit authority” of Congress.102 The Court held 
that the congressional grant compelled it only to engage in a rational 
basis review.103 Yakima, however, is not necessarily as helpful as it might 
initially seem in solving the devolvability problem for two reasons. First, 
as Michael Wishnie points out, the legislation under review in Yakima 
differs substantially from the Personal Responsibility Act.104 The Yakima 
law worked to benefit Native Americans rather than to withdraw any 
benefits.  The court’s holding was limited to non-harmful legislation, and 
thus did not address what the standard of review might be if state 
legislation discriminated against, rather than in favor of, Native 
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Americans.105 Second, Wishnie proposes that the power over Indian 
affairs and the power over immigration are fundamentally different in 
nature, and that the former power appears more likely to be devolvable. 
This is because, while immigration matters necessarily involve 
interactions with the citizens and governments of other sovereign 
nations, the relationship between the government and Native Americans 
is strictly internal.106 Furthermore, the blame for Native American 
oppression is shared by the states and the federal government, and 
consequently “the states too bear a special responsibility towards Native 
Americans.”107 
In keeping with its avoidance of any discussion of the nature of the 
immigration power, the Soskin majority made no reference to Yakima. If 
it had decided to do so the court might have used that decision to bolster 
its own conclusion. At the very least, the Yakima decision illustrates that 
the possibility of devolution of an exclusively federal power108 has not 
been entirely foreclosed by the Supreme Court. But beyond this 
threshold inference Yakima is of little help, due to qualitative differences 
both between the laws under review and between the governmental 
powers from which they derive. 
A third jurisprudential argument supporting devolvability arises 
from the fact that while immigration regulation is controlled primarily by 
federal statute,109 some of its aspects are dependent upon state law. 
Howard Chang observed several examples of such interaction, such as 
instances in which a marriage-based immigration visa hinges upon the 
marriage’s validity under state law110 and instances in which federal 
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deportation statutes on grounds of a crime that involves “moral 
turpitude” or is punishable by at least one year111 depend on state 
criminal law.112 This argument seems to suggest that the immigration 
power is susceptible of devolution because it is already being devolved 
in certain ways. Chang reasons that the disparity among state laws that 
are pertinent to immigration procedures results in the “delegat[ion of] 
some authority to the states” to govern deportation and exclusion of 
aliens.113 One might infer that the interactive nature of immigration 
policy in some specific situations reveals that the “plenary” federal 
power is inherently linked to state law and thus is not as insulated from 
state influence as is widely supposed. The Soskin opinion may be read as 
expanding upon this already-existing interaction, and not merely placing 
a stamp of approval on a novel state power. 
Plainly, though, this argument alone would not be sufficient to re-
characterize the plenary power doctrine for two reasons. First, state laws 
that bear upon the federal scheme are not enacted for the purpose of 
regulating immigration. Indeed, state legislators almost certainly did not 
contemplate whether and in what circumstances aliens might be deported 
when devising criminal sentencing statutes. These state laws serve the 
primary purpose of governing the citizens of the state; their relevance to 
federal law is entirely incidental. The second reason that this argument 
fails is closely related to the first: even though state laws play a role in 
immigration law, the states have no say in what role such laws play. For 
example, the Immigration and Naturalization Act may require 
deportation of aliens who have committed crimes punishable by five 
years, or two years, or one day in prison, and the states would be 
beholden to that criterion. The power given to the states in the Personal 
Responsibility Act and ratified in Soskin, unlike the powers described 
above, allows the states purposefully to pass legislation that targets 
immigrants and dictates how they will be treated. 
Perhaps the most compelling legally-based arguments in favor of a 
non-devolvability principle have already been discussed above: the first 
is found in the words of the Graham Court: “[a] congressional enactment 
construed so as to . . . adopt divergent laws on the subject of citizenship 
requirements for federally supported welfare programs would appear to 
contravene [the] explicit constitutional requirement of uniformity.”114 
This statement, although dictum, militates strongly against the 
devolvability of the immigration power. The second argument springs 
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from the notion that powers inherent in the sovereign must be exercised 
by the sovereign alone, and is expressed by Barbara Arnold.115 These 
arguments can, however, be supplemented with several others. 
One such argument is based in the text of the statute itself. Included 
in the section of the Personal Responsibility Act authorizing state 
discrimination is the following provision: 
With respect to the State authority to make determinations 
concerning the eligibility of qualified aliens for public benefits in 
this chapter, a State that chooses to follow the Federal 
classification in determining the eligibility of such aliens shall . . 
. be considered to have chosen the least restrictive means 
available for achieving the compelling governmental interest of 
assuring that aliens be self-reliant in accordance with national 
immigration policy.116 
Notwithstanding the fact that this provision is a vain attempt to 
usurp from the judiciary the task of “say[ing] what the law is,”117 it 
reveals that Congress assumed that the state laws would still be subject to 
strict scrutiny despite its authorization. The Supreme Court has held that 
fiscal motive such as that which is advanced through the Personal 
Responsibility Act cannot suffice as a compelling state interest,118 and 
thus it is highly doubtful that Congress’s instruction to the courts to find 
a compelling interest in this particular species of fiscal motivation would 
withstand review.119 If Congress had intended to extend the luxury of 
rational basis review to the states, then why would it have included this 
provision? The Soskin court addresses this language and finds no 
problem with it, stating that “to say that [Congress’s] statute would 
survive strict scrutiny is a far cry from Congress’s stating that the statute 
should be subject to such scrutiny.”120 That may be so, but the provision 
nonetheless implies that Congress did not envision rational basis review 
of state-imposed benefit restrictions. It also implies that Congress 
questioned the constitutionality of its delegation of the immigration 
power, and therefore attempted to avoid the issue by including language 
that, if accepted, would ensure that the Act did not run afoul of Graham. 
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Additional support for a non-devolvability argument can be gleaned 
from a long line of Supreme Court cases, in addition to Mathews and 
Graham, that emphatically place the immigration power exclusively in 
the hands of the federal government. In particular, the Court stated in 
Chae Chan Ping v. United States that this authority “cannot be granted 
away”121 and is “incapable of transfer.”122 Of course, the Court did not 
address, either in Chae Chan Ping or at any other time, whether statutory 
authorization of state action qualifies as a “transfer” or a “granting 
away.” The cases in which the Court expounded upon the nature of the 
immigration power invariably involved challenges of state laws enacted 
without any authorization analogous to the Act, and thus the issue has 
never been squarely presented. Still, the holding that the power is 
“incapable of transfer” is unaccompanied by any qualification by the 
court.123 
If Soskin, or another case challenging the Personal Responsibility 
Act, does come before the Supreme Court for review, then the Court will 
be presented with three options: it may finally rein in the plenary power 
doctrine, deciding that the judicial policy of outright denial of 
constitutional protection in immigration matters is ripe for modification; 
it may reaffirm the plenary power doctrine yet again, and in so doing 
strike down the Act as an impermissible delegation of federal power; or 
it may uphold the doctrine and the Act. It seems, though, in consideration 
of the Court’s prior holdings, that something has to give, and that the 
latter scenario is unlikely. The Act represents an unprecedented departure 
from the plenary power doctrine—this is a fact the Soskin court failed to 
acknowledge, and one that our highest court must acknowledge if it is to 
justify the law under existing jurisprudence. 
2. Policy-Based Arguments 
The constitutional implications of the Personal Responsibility Act 
and of Soskin’s validation of it are nothing if not nebulous. Public policy 
rationales for and against state-imposed immigration regulation, on the 
other hand, have been clearly voiced, and can be analyzed independently 
of the legality of the Act. 
Perhaps the strongest policy argument in favor of affording states 
the power to withhold benefits to aliens is that it is an effective way to 
control costs. Medicaid consumes an enormous chunk of state budgets 
nationwide; indeed, a representative of the National Governors’ 
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Association recently revealed that last year, for the first time, Medicaid 
surpassed public education as the single largest expenditure among 
states.124 Medicaid costs have continued to grow in recent years, with 
average increases of 10.2% per year from 2000 to 2003.125 As a result, 
total combined federal and state spending has ballooned from $205.7 
billion in 2000 to $275.5 billion in 2003. The single biggest cause of this 
leap has been an abrupt increase in the number of enrollees, which, in 
turn, was likely caused by the general economic downturn that has 
affected this nation for the past several years.126 
Congress may or may not have taken the Medicaid juggernaut into 
account when passing the Personal Responsibility Act in 1996. The Act’s 
stated intention was to prevent immigrants from perceiving the 
availability of any type of public benefit as an incentive to immigrate.127 
The fact cannot be ignored, however, that Medicaid is the most costly 
and most widely utilized state-administered public benefit program, and 
by a significant margin.128 Various strategies to control the growth of 
Medicaid and to allocate its costs among the federal government, the 
states, and perhaps even beneficiaries, have been and will continue to be 
proposed. One such strategy employed by the states has been to restrict 
eligibility; thanks to the Personal Responsibility Act they can pursue this 
goal by denying benefits to aliens. This plan seems on the surface to be 
logical, especially in light of the increasing enrollment that has been the 
main cause of skyrocketing costs. Fewer eligible recipients should mean 
lower costs, as well as a more robust Medicaid system for those who do 
qualify. 
The Soskin majority was certainly not oblivious to the economic 
realities facing Colorado when considering its decision. This is not to say 
that fiscal concerns drove the court to its outcome, but this rationale for 
denying benefits, while it comes in response to what is admittedly one of 
the largest budgetary problems facing our governments today, is not as 
sound as it may initially seem. The reason is that immigrants consume 
such a small part of total Medicaid expenditures. The State of Colorado 
estimated that implementation of its new stricter law would save the 
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government $5.9 million in the first year of the law’s implementation.129 
When these savings are compared with Colorado’s total federal- and 
state-funded Medicaid spending—$2.5 billion in Fiscal Year 2003130—it 
becomes apparent that the new Colorado law does not contribute to 
solving the Medicaid problem in any significant way. The decision to 
remove the only access to vital health services available to thousands of 
people has a tremendous impact on the lives of those people. The impact 
on the state budget, on the other hand, is so slight as to be considered 
negligible. Legal analysis aside, the benefits of this approach seem to be 
outweighed by the substantial societal detriments inflicted. 
Moreover, while these immigrants are being denied the right to 
Medicaid, most of them will presumably remain residents of Colorado. 
Inevitably they will require various types of medical care, emergency 
and otherwise, for which providers will go uncompensated. At least if 
Colorado were to cover immigrants under Medicaid it would have the 
opportunity to subsidize the bill with matching federal funds. Without 
Medicaid, immigrants will no doubt receive fewer services, but they will 
continue to require emergency care and will continue to visit emergency 
rooms when they think they need treatment. Denial of Medicaid benefits 
to these people does not eliminate costs to the government completely; it 
does, however, require the state to bear these costs without federal 
assistance. Considering the paltry gains anticipated by the new law, it 
becomes questionable whether, in the long run, this policy is sound from 
an economic point of view. 
The devolution of the immigration power has also been defended 
on the grounds that ensuring a uniform immigration policy is not 
necessarily beneficial to aliens. Howard Chang has pointed out that the 
goal of uniformity does not, as Michael Wishnie suggests,131 coincide 
with the goals of promoting anticaste or antidiscrimination principles. 
Nationwide uniformity will not invariably translate into uniform access 
among aliens to public benefits; such a policy is also likely, in certain 
circumstances, to result in uniform denial nationwide.132 Mathews makes 
clear that Congress could constitutionally eliminate all benefits to aliens 
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tomorrow if it chose. Accordingly, if the Supreme Court “had bound 
Congress with a constitutional constraint of uniformity in the political 
atmosphere of 1996, then Congress might have excluded immigrants 
from Medicaid . . . rather than leaving the question of immigrant access 
up to the states.”133 Congress’s decision may be viewed as a means to 
provide supplemental benefits in addition to the minimum standard 
established in Washington. Thus, states wielding immigration authority 
do not become “laboratories of bigotry” as Wishnie forewarns, but 
“laboratories of generosity” that may elect to exceed federal baseline 
eligibility.134 
This line of reasoning tracks that of the Soskin decision. The 
potential “laboratories of generosity” to which Chang optimistically 
refers would spring from the “national policy,” referred to in Soskin, that 
allows “discretion . . . limited to the remaining optional range of 
coverage” that is neither prohibited nor guaranteed under the Act.135  The 
Soskin majority, like Chang, interpreted the Act as creating a minimum 
standard that may be exceeded, rather than as an invitation to proliferate 
a multitude of minimum standards. This reasoning does hold some merit, 
since, from an alien’s perspective, a permissive statute is clearly 
preferable to a flat federal prohibition of benefits. But perhaps Chang and 
others are being too presumptuous when they predict that in the absence 
of a devolutionary standard Congress would enact such sweeping reform 
as to deny access altogether. That Mathews condones such an action is 
beyond dispute; that Congress would ever support an outright denial to 
all aliens of all public benefits is highly speculative, and would further 
test the plenary power doctrine—perhaps even to the point of convincing 
the Supreme Court to re-examine Mathews. 
Furthermore, to laud the Act’s permissive provisions as opening the 
door for state-level benevolence is to overlook the fact that states will 
not, in response to the Act, elect to augment their benefit packages or 
expand their eligibility criteria. The “laboratories of generosity” 
supposedly created by the Act will actually consist of those states that 
choose not to offer more benefits, but merely to maintain the levels of 
coverage that they provided before they were permitted to lower those 
levels. Colorado, bear in mind, did not pass legislation restricting 
Medicaid access until 2003.136 Does that mean Colorado was a 
“laboratory of generosity” until 2003?  The main flaw with this 
alternative conception of Congress’s devolution is that to embrace it fully 
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one must ignore the starting points from which state legislatures are 
acting. When these legislatures are invoking their new power to 
discriminate against aliens, they are withdrawing benefits that had 
previously been available to aliens for a long period of time. Those states 
that have not yet chosen to withdraw benefits may or may not be 
refraining out of generosity. Those that have chosen to invoke the Act, 
however, are undeniably undertaking to discriminate. 
Peter Spiro has voiced a similar defense to the devolutionary 
principle, identifying state-derived discrimination as “the lesser evil.”137 
He has extolled a system of “steam-valve federalism,” in which the 
effects of a particular state’s discriminatory leanings are confined to that 
state, rather than being “visited on the rest of us by way of 
Washington.”138 It is better for discriminatory “steam” to be released 
through a state legislative “valve,” argues Spiro, than to be allowed to 
exert pressure on the federal legislative process.139 He, like Chang, 
predicts that a non-devolvability rule will invite a policy of “blanket 
ineligibility.”140 Again, this assertion is nothing more than conjecture, 
and does not alone suffice to legitimize a devolutionary principle. 
Nevertheless, the “steam-valve” rationale has been acknowledged by 
Wishnie as “the principle policy defense of devolution.”141 Wishnie finds 
the defense flawed however, challenging the contention that individual 
state actors have consistently succeeded in enacting national immigration 
legislation.142 He further observes that judicial invalidation of 
impermissible state-imposed discriminatory laws “rarely has provoked 
frustrated states to seek to impose their anti-immigrant preferences at the 
national level.”143 
For aliens, “steam-valve federalism” is no doubt a preferable 
alternative to blanket ineligibility. But it seems too presumptuous to 
suggest that the stifling of a state legislative valve would enable a small 
faction to effect such a drastic national policy shift. Chang and Spiro also 
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assume that Congress would have had no compunction in cutting off 
aliens completely if it had not instead chosen to devolve its authority. 
The very reason that Congress engaged in this substantial departure from 
prior law was, perhaps, that it perceived a need for change and felt 
compelled to pursue an alternative to outright denial. Congressional 
consent to discriminatory policies that, in reality, have only been 
embraced by a handful of states is nowhere near as damaging to the alien 
class as blanket ineligibility would be. In short, an outright denial would 
not be imposed lightly, nor without a fight. 
Spiro also argues in defense of devolvability that state authority 
over immigration policy will not lead states to a “race to the bottom”; 
that is, states will not inevitably legislate the most restrictive laws 
allowed by the Act.144 It has been supposed that one state’s decision to 
restrict benefits will have the dual effects of driving aliens to more 
generous neighboring states and causing those states to deflect a potential 
influx by enacting discriminatory laws of their own.145  Spiro describes 
the risk of this scenario as “slight,” though, because countervailing 
forces, both economic and political, will prevent a cyclical shrinking of 
public benefits.146 In particular, he predicts that the global marketplace 
will act as a check on discriminatory sentiments.147 States considering 
discriminatory legislation will, according to this defense, be wary of the 
possibility that foreign and alien-friendly commercial entities would take 
their business elsewhere in the face of such discrimination.148 That states 
will take this potential economic consequence into account is 
theoretically possible; but this explanation against a race to the bottom 
may overestimate the economic influence that aliens are capable of 
exerting, even by way of their powerful benefactors in the business 
community. It seems unlikely that commercial entities would typically 
maintain such intense sympathy for aliens’ welfare as to suffer the 
considerable economic burden of packing up and reestablishing their 
businesses elsewhere.  This type of response from businesses may be 
evoked in certain circumstances,149 but whether market forces will 
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generally be able to counterbalance a political trend toward 
discrimination is doubtful. 
The Soskin opinion does not address the possibility of a race to the 
bottom, presumably because Colorado was among the first states to enact 
this type of legislation and there is not yet any indication that a cyclical 
curtailment of alien benefits is on the horizon. Yet the prospect should 
not be dismissed simply because it has not yet come to fruition, 
especially in light of the seemingly ubiquitous belt-tightening that has 
characterized state and federal government in recent years. Colorado will 
not likely be the last state to turn to the Personal Responsibility Act when 
considering budget cuts. How much of an impact the Act will have on 
the alien class as a whole is impossible to predict, but a trend towards 
widespread state-based discrimination is not out of the question. On the 
contrary, it is a very real threat, and represents a worst-case scenario that 
will (and should) prompt aliens and their advocates to continue to contest 
the constitutionality of the Act. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The Personal Responsibility Act has blurred the long-standing 
bright line drawn by the Supreme Court between federal and state 
authority to discriminate against aliens. The plenary power doctrine has 
taken its share of criticisms for being antithetical to fundamental equal 
protection and due process principles; but at least before the Personal 
Responsibility Act this potentially dangerous power resided only in 
Congress. Now, the Tenth Circuit has taken a substantial first step 
toward the extension of that power to the states. In doing so the court 
failed to delve deeply into either the constitutional implications of 
congressional devolution or the policy rationales supporting or attacking 
devolution. The majority’s holding that “a state’s exercise of discretion 
can . . . effectuate national policy”150 does not answer the root question: 
is a national policy that promotes divergent state policies permissible? 
The language invoked by the Supreme Court in Chae Chan Ping 
(the immigration power “cannot be granted away”)151 and in Graham 
(“Congress does not have the power to authorize the individual states to 
violate the Equal Protection Clause”)152 suggests that the answer is no. 
The Soskin decision marks the judicial approval of an unprecedented 
attempt by Congress to lend its previously exclusive power to the states. 
The majority in Soskin did not satisfactorily address the novelty of this 
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congressional action, nor did it satisfactorily explain why the Act does 
not violate Graham in spite of the plain language of Graham indicating 
otherwise. 
The documented aliens residing within our borders are very much a 
part of our society. They work full-time jobs and pay taxes, just as their 
citizen counterparts do. They are challenged to meet the ever-increasing 
burden of providing vital healthcare for themselves and their children. To 
withdraw this benefit from them, while it may modestly lower Medicaid 
expenditures, may not be beneficial in the aggregate. Aliens will 
continue to live and work in the United States, and they will continue to 
need and receive medical care. Denial of Medicaid benefits may result in 
nothing more than a shifting of costs from the Medicaid program to 
hospitals and other non-profit providers that have a duty to provide care 
to those who seek it regardless of their ability to pay. In this scenario 
everyone will lose—aliens will encounter great difficulty in receiving 
free care, and hospitals will become even more financially strained than 
they currently are. And this scenario may become even more undesirable 
for hospitals if a “race to the bottom” develops. 
Although the constitutionality of the Personal Responsibility Act 
itself and the wisdom of the policy behind it are two different issues, 
both seem at least somewhat doubtful. The constitutionality of 
devolution will not be resolved once and for all until the Supreme Court 
reconciles Soskin and the Act with prior decisions such as Chae Chan 
Ping and Graham. Until then, aliens can only hope that more 
“laboratories of bigotry” are not created as a result of the Act.153    
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